By Arman Shariati

Iran’s nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan were never hidden from public view. They were declared facilities, known to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose inspectors have visited them for years.

They were also part of a nationwide, industrial-scale effort to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This was the stated purpose behind Iran’s uranium enrichment program. A non-peaceful nuclear program would not necessarily require such an extensive and concentrated industrial effort and the IAEA inspectors would find it difficult to access them.

Over the course of two wars imposed on Iran in less than a year, the United States and the Israeli regime repeatedly struck these nuclear sites. During the 40-Day war, launched on February 28, projectiles even landed near the Bushehr nuclear power plant, a facility that has been operating for years and could hardly be mistaken for a clandestine weapons laboratory.

Few industrial installations anywhere in the world have been subjected to such close and continuous scrutiny and inspections as Iranian nuclear sites, which the chief of Iran’s nuclear agency, Mohammad Eslami, has also repeatedly emphasized.

Iran opened its doors to an extensive network of IAEA inspections, surveillance cameras, and monitoring seals, making them among the most closely monitored nuclear facilities in history.

Yet the world – and the UN nuclear watchdog body – watched in silence as they were bombed repeatedly during the two imposed wars, despite their status under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the international legal framework that was supposed to protect the rights and obligations established by it.

Following extensive attacks on scientific and industrial centres, and the martyrdom of thousands of Iranians, most of them civilians, in the two imposed wars, the country once again faces threats of strikes against its nuclear sites, including the Pickaxe Mountain complex near Natanz in central Iran.

What makes these threats particularly alarming is the identity of those behind them. Both entities possess nuclear weapons. Israel, for its part, has never officially acknowledged its nuclear arsenal or agreed to provide transparency about its weapons program. It is also among those that have refused to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Moreover, American rhetoric has gone far beyond the language of conventional warfare. President Donald Trump, who faced a disgraceful drubbing in November 3 midterms for precisely the same reason, has repeatedly threatened to “destroy Iranian civilization and leave the country with no hope for future generations.”

Clearly, conventional weapons alone cannot wipe out an entire civilization or extinguish the future of an ancient people. To Iranian ears, threats of this magnitude sound unmistakably like threats of nuclear attack.

In effect, Iranians are being threatened with thermonuclear genocide. Needless to say, public sentiment toward the NPT has soured considerably inside Iran.

A one-sided bargain

Major General Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, recently said in an interview that Iran’s continued membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could no longer be guaranteed if another war is launched on Iran, particularly given that the country has failed to benefit from the promises enshrined in the treaty.

Although he is the most senior security official to have made such a statement publicly, he is far from alone. This sentiment is increasingly shared by politicians, political and security elites, and even ordinary citizens across the country.

Most people around the world would struggle to explain what the NPT entails. Most Iranians, however, are familiar with it. Opened for signature in 1968, the treaty rests on three pillars. The first is non-proliferation, which means non-nuclear-weapon states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons. The second is disarmament, which implies nuclear-armed states commit to pursuing negotiations aimed at ending the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. The third is the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Article IV recognizes the "inalienable right" of all parties to research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In return for forgoing nuclear weapons, non-nuclear-weapon signatories accept IAEA safeguards, while the treaty provides for international cooperation and the sharing of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

Iran's experience of this bargain has been bleak. It accepted inspections, agreed to restrictions when required, and maintained that it had fulfilled its commitments. What it received in return, however, was unjust sanctions, sabotage operations targeting its nuclear program, the assassination of some of its most prominent scientists, and, ultimately, wars and bombings.

From Tehran's perspective, none of the benefits promised under the treaty have materialized.

Iran's one-way cooperation has only made matters worse. Iranian officials say some IAEA inspectors were involved in espionage. Even more serious are reports that information about underground facilities, including coordinates and technical details contained in blueprints submitted to the IAEA or recorded by its inspectors, was used to facilitate the strikes.

From Tehran's perspective, information provided in the spirit of transparency and cooperation was turned into a targeting package. In short, as the people of Iran believe, the country's cooperation was used against it. The resentment and anger generated by this experience have hardened into a conviction that now increasingly shapes policymaking in Tehran.

The street and the parliament

Public discontent has been building for some time, and the two imposed wars have accelerated the trend. Members of parliament have publicly announced plans to draft a legal framework for withdrawing from the treaty, while some have openly declared their readiness to pursue an exit. Many Iranians say support for withdrawal is steadily growing.

According to those voices, a large majority now favours leaving the NPT in response to continued threats and aggression from the two rogue nuclear powers.

Cooperation with the IAEA has already been suspended following the unprovoked aggression. Against this backdrop, withdrawal from the treaty is no longer a fringe proposition. The question increasingly being debated is not whether Iran should leave, but when and how.

The legal door: Article X

Iran’s case rests on a provision of the treaty that is rarely examined in full. Article X allows any party to withdraw if it concludes that “extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”

The withdrawing state must give three months’ notice to all other parties to the treaty and to the UN Security Council. In effect, the withdrawal process is set in motion by a 90-day notice period.

Iran’s circumstances provide an especially compelling case for invoking this provision. Two illegal wars of aggression, attacks on declared nuclear facilities, and threats of nuclear-scale destruction are precisely the kind of extraordinary events that justify withdrawal under Article X. From this perspective, leaving the treaty would not constitute defiance of international law, but rather an exercise of a legal right to protect national security.

The strategic argument follows. Without inspectors on the ground, the United States and Israel would lose an important source of on-site information about Iran’s nuclear facilities and activities. Iranian officials and supporters of withdrawal maintain that such information could be exploited to facilitate more assassinations, sabotage operations, and military attacks on Iranian territory and nuclear infrastructure.

Many in Iran believe inspections provide a window through which adversaries can look. Closing that window is therefore presented as an act of self-defence.

The threshold question

Much of the debate in Western capitals rests on the assumption that Iran is racing to develop a nuclear weapon. Tehran's response is that it does not need to acquire an entirely new technology to do so. Iran has possessed the necessary scientific and technical expertise for decades, yet has maintained that it has chosen a peaceful nuclear path.

The heavy-water reactor at Arak, designed and built by Iranian engineers, is often cited as evidence of the country's advanced nuclear capabilities, extending well beyond uranium enrichment. The famous religious ruling (fatwa) issued by the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, against nuclear weapons also remains part of Iran's stated policy framework.

Tehran maintains that its nuclear program will remain peaceful, with officials emphasizing the need to protect facilities, infrastructure, and scientific personnel rather than pursue weapons.

But public anger is simmering amid continued threats, particularly nuclear threats against the country. Many ordinary Iranians are increasingly calling for a stronger deterrent and advocating steps that go beyond the country's current nuclear policy. Under mounting domestic and external pressure, the range of policy options being debated is expanding.

The day after

If the decision to withdraw is made and parliament adopts the necessary legislation, the government would formally submit its Article X notice, setting the 90-day withdrawal period in motion.

During those first three months, diplomatic tensions would almost certainly intensify. Western capitals would likely condemn the move as a grave escalation, while the United States and European governments could respond with additional sanctions and other punitive measures.

Russia and China, meanwhile, would likely call for restraint and oppose further punitive action. Military threats would also remain a feature of the crisis.

Yet the most consequential change could be informational. The IAEA would lose its treaty-based inspection rights and the continuity of knowledge it has maintained over Iran's enriched uranium stocks, centrifuges, and related nuclear activities.

The resulting loss of oversight would make it considerably more difficult for the international community to assess the status and direction of Iran's nuclear program.

For Iran, several paths would remain open. Tehran could withdraw from the NPT while maintaining a peaceful nuclear program, using the greater freedom from treaty-based restrictions to rebuild and strengthen its domestic capabilities.

Alternatively, it could adopt a posture of deliberate strategic ambiguity, which means developing and retaining the capacity to produce nuclear weapons without actually building one, a form of deterrence advocated by some proponents of withdrawal.

A third possibility would be to go further still, although such a move would reverse the religious ruling issued by the martyred Leader and the state's own publicly declared policy.

Iran's case is coherent on its own terms. A country attacked by nuclear-armed adversaries, unable to rely on the protections and benefits it believes the treaty should provide, and increasingly unwilling to remain subject to international inspections has clear incentives to reconsider its commitments.

Where the chain leads

A chain of events has been set in motion by unprovoked, illegal and unjustified attacks on Iran’s declared nuclear facilities, threats of nuclear-scale destruction, and the growing conviction in Tehran that international cooperation has been turned into a weapon against the country.

Those who launched these wars, and the rhetoric that accompanied them, must bear responsibility for any subsequent shift in Iran’s nuclear policy.

Whatever decision Tehran ultimately makes, it will be a response to the aggression inflicted upon it.